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Abstract 
 
Over the past decade there has been an increasing number of disputes concerning 
the enforcement and licensing of patents covering technical standards.  These disputes 
have taken on a global character and often involve litigation in North America, Europe 
and Asia.  And while many of the parties are the same in actions around the world, courts 
and governmental agencies in different jurisdictions have begun to develop distinctive 
approaches to some of these issues.  Thus, while areas of convergence exist, national 
laws differ on important issues including the availability of injunctive relief for FRAND-
encumbered SEPs, the appropriate method for calculating FRAND royalties, the 
competition implications of violating a FRAND commitment, and the contours of the 
FRAND non-discrimination obligation. Thus, at least until greater international 
harmonization is achieved, firms doing business globally must remain particularly 
attuned to the evolving legal landscape in this area. This paper presents a brief overview 
of recent disputes that have arisen around the world with respect to the acquisition, 
enforcement and licensing of patents that are essential to technical interoperability 
standards.  It is intended as an introduction and covers only the highlights of many 
complex and controversial subjects. The reader who wishes to obtain a more 
comprehensive treatment of the topics covered in this paper is referred to the additional 
references listed in the Appendix. 
  
                                               
1 © Jorge L. Contreras 2017-18.  This paper is based on the author’s lecture of the same title 
delivered at Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, on December 7, 2017.  An earlier version of this article was 
translated into Japanese by Mr. Yoshihiko Kido, Patent Attorney admitted in Japan, and Professor Yuko 
Kimijima, Keio University, with the author’s permission.  The Japanese version appeared in the Keio 
University Journal of Law, Politics and Sociology.  A Chinese translation of the current version of this 
article is being prepared by Prof. Dr. Liyang Hou of KoGuan Law School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. 
2 A compendium of the author’s work on technical standards, intellectual property and other topics 
can be found at http://ssrn.com/author=1335192. 
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I. Standards, Standardization and Patents 
 
Technical interoperability standards affect all aspects of the modern networked 
economy. Every smartphone, laptop, and digital file, along with thousands of other high-
tech and low-tech products, depends on standards to operate within a network of devices 
sold by thousands of different vendors. The existence of these standards, and the 
widespread product interoperability that they enable, give rise to significant market 
efficiencies known as “network effects.” It is widely acknowledged that standards can 
increase innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice; foster public health and safety; and 
enable efficient and reliable international trade.3 
 
Most of the thousands of technical standards currently deployed throughout the 
world were developed collaboratively by market participants in voluntary standards-
development organizations (SDOs).4  SDOs range from officially recognized bodies that 
address a diverse range of standardization projects (e.g., the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO)), to large, well-established private sector groups that address 
the standardization needs of major industry segments (e.g., the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 
and Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)) to smaller groups often 
referred to as “consortia” that focus on one or a handful of related standards (e.g., the 
HDMI Forum, Bluetooth Special Interest Group, USB Forum).  Because of the 
significant market benefits that are made possible by technical standards, a high degree of 
cooperation among competitors has long been tolerated by antitrust and competition law 
authorities, which might otherwise discourage such large-scale coordination efforts 
among competitors.5 
 
Many of the technological features specified by standards can be patented.  Such 
patents are typically obtained by those participants in a standardization activity that make 
technical contributions to the standard (SDOs themselves almost never obtain patent 
protection over their standards).  However, to the extent that patents cover technologies 
that are “essential” to the implementation of a standard (“standards-essential patents” or 
“SEPs”), concerns can arise.  
 
Ordinarily, if the manufacturer of a product that allegedly infringes a patent is 
unable, or does not wish, to obtain a license on the terms offered by the patent holder, 
that manufacturer has three choices: to stop selling the infringing product, to design 
around the patent, or do neither and risk liability as an infringer. With standardized 
products, however, the manufacturer’s choices are more limited, as designing around the 
patent may be impossible or may make the product non-compliant with the standard (e.g., 
who would sell a smartphone today without Wi-Fi capability?). Moreover, once a 
                                               
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 (2007) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC 
ANTITRUST & IPR]. 
4 So-called de facto standards, which are developed by a single company and later gain market 
acceptance, are not addressed by this paper. 
5 DOJ/FTC Antitrust & IPR, p. 33. 
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standard is approved and released by an SDO, manufacturers may make significant 
internal investments on the basis of the standard. In such cases, the cost of switching 
from the standardized technology to an alternative technology may be prohibitive (a 
situation often referred to as “lock-in”). Once manufacturers are locked into a particular 
standardized technology, the holders of SEPs covering that technology may be able to 
extract fees from them that exceed the value of their patented technology, simply because 
the manufacturer is unable to switch to an alternative technology without incurring 
substantial costs. This phenomenon has been termed patent “hold-up” and is discussed 
extensively in the literature. In addition to harming potential competitors, patent hold-up 
can have other undesirable market effects, including raising prices for consumers and 
hindering technological innovation. 
 
The risk of hold-up is likely to increase as the number of parties holding SEPs 
that cover a single standard rises.  Complex technological products may implement 
dozens, if not hundreds of standards, each of which may be covered by hundreds or 
thousands of patents held be a wide range of parties. As such, the aggregation of royalty 
demands by multiple patent holders could lead to cost-prohibitive burdens on 
implementing standards-compliant products. This situation is sometimes referred to as 
“royalty stacking”. Royalty stacking can arise “when a standard implicates numerous 
patents, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands,” each of which bears a royalty that must be 
paid by product manufacturers and which “may become excessive in the aggregate.”6 
 
In order to mitigate the threats of patent hold-up and royalty stacking, many SDOs 
have adopted internal policies that are binding on their participants. These policies fall 
into two general categories: disclosure policies and licensing policies. Disclosure policies 
require SDO participants to disclose SEPs that they hold, generally prior to the approval 
of a relevant standard. These disclosures are often made available to the public via the 
Internet.7  Early disclosure of SEPs enables standards developers to decide whether or not 
to approve a design that is covered by these SEPS, to choose an alternative, non-
infringing technology, to modify a draft standard before it is approved to eliminate the 
infringing feature, or to seek licenses to the patented technology. 
 
Licensing policies, on the other hand, require SEP holders to grant manufacturers 
of standardized products licenses to use their SEPs on terms that are either royalty-free 
(RF) or “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). These commitments are 
intended to assure product manufacturers that they will be able to obtain all SEP licenses 
necessary to manufacture a standardized product. FRAND or RF licensing commitments 
are required of all SDOs accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
and are also utilized widely among other SDOs around the world.  
 
                                               
6 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
7  For example, IETF (https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/), ETSI (https://ipr.etsi.org), and ISO 
(https://www.iso.org/iso-standards-and-patents.html) all have publicly-accessible online databases 
containing SEP disclosures by their participants. 
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Despite the appeal of FRAND commitments, a consistent, practical, and readily 
enforceable definition of FRAND has proven difficult to achieve.8 Virtually no SDO 
defines precisely what this phrase means, and many SDOs, including IEEE and IETF, 
affirmatively disclaim any role in establishing, interpreting, or adjudicating the 
reasonableness of FRAND licensing terms. In fact, some SDOs go so far as to prohibit 
discussions of royalties and other licensing terms at SDO meetings, making the 
development of a consensus view difficult. Such ambiguity, it is argued, may permit 
opportunistic SEP holders to insist on licensing terms, particularly royalty rates, that are 
not bounded by meaningful limitations. This lack of certainty has contributed to the 
litigation over FRAND commitments. Such disputes have arisen when a SEP holder and 
a product manufacturer cannot agree on the terms of a license and there is disagreement 
whether the patent holder’s proposed royalty is “reasonable.” However, FRAND disputes 
can also involve the reasonableness of non-royalty terms, such as requirements that the 
vendor license-back its own patents to the patent holder (“reciprocity”) or that the license 
be “suspended” if the manufacturer threatens the patent holder with litigation (“defensive 
suspension”). When parties cannot agree on license terms, no license is granted and any 
product that conforms to a standard may infringe the patent holder’s SEPs. The parties 
are thus left in a difficult and ambiguous situation, which has led to a vigorous debate 
within industry, government, and academia regarding the scope and contour of FRAND 
obligations. Some of the specific issues in dispute are discussed in the following sections. 
II. Injunctive Relief and Standards Essential Patents 
 
An injunction is a judicial remedy under which certain actions can be prohibited 
through the power of the court.  In the case of patents, an injunction is typically sought by 
a patent holder in order to prevent an infringer from continuing to make, use or sell 
infringing goods or services. Injunctive relief is available in one form or another in most 
developed countries. 
A.  Injunctions in the United States 
1.  The eBay Framework 
 
The analysis of injunctive relief in U.S. patent cases takes its current form from 
the 2006 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.9  In 
eBay the Supreme Court held that the decision to grant or deny an injunction is an act of 
judicial discretion that must be exercised in accordance with “well-established principles 
of equity” (p. 391). The Court articulated a four-factor equitable test to be applied by 
courts considering the grant of injunctive relief. This test requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate: 
 
 
                                               
8 The remainder of this discussion will focus on FRAND commitments, as the interpretation of RF 
commitments is significantly less controversial. 
9 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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1. that it has suffered an irreparable injury;  
2. that remedies available at law [i.e., monetary damages] are inadequate to 
compensate it for that injury;  
3. that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and  
4. that the public interest would not be disserved by the award of an 
injunction. 
 
In view of these factors, some commentators and litigants in the U.S. have argued 
that a SEP holder, by making a FRAND commitment, implicitly concedes that remedies 
available at law (i.e., monetary damages) must be adequate to compensate it for the 
infringement of its SEPs by parties implementing a standard. They reason that, by 
committing to grant a license on FRAND terms, the SEP holder has agreed not to exclude 
others from the market, but will instead collect only a “reasonable” royalty to compensate 
it for the infringement of its SEPs. As a result, they argue that the second eBay factor can 
never be satisfied by a patent holder that has made a FRAND commitment, and therefor 
such a patent holder should generally be precluded from seeking injunctive relief to 
prevent others from operating under its SEPs. The interplay of FRAND commitments 
with the U.S. law of patent injunctions has given rise to several judicial decisions as well 
as guidance from regulatory and enforcement agencies in the U.S. 
 
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,10 Motorola sought an injunction to prevent 
Microsoft’s continued infringement of Motorola’s patents covering two industry 
standards (IEEE’s 802.11 and ITU’s H.264) as to which Motorola made FRAND 
commitments. The court evaluated Motorola’s request for an injunction in view of the 
four eBay factors and determined that Motorola did not suffer an irreparable injury or 
show that monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate it for the infringement. 
Accordingly, the court denied Motorola’s request for an injunction. 
 
In Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp.,11 the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California held that a SEP holder breached its FRAND commitment 
by seeking injunctive relief against an implementer of a standard before the patent holder 
offered a license to the implementer. Again, the injunction was denied. 
 
These district court decisions laid the groundwork for the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit to consider the issue of injunctive relief in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc..12  
In this case, the trial court denied Motorola’s motion for an injunction on SEPs allegedly 
infringed by Apple’s products.  In rejecting Motorola’s arguments, the trial court 
reasoned that a patent holder making a FRAND commitment, by definition, 
acknowledges that a monetary royalty is adequate compensation, thereby eliminating any 
argument that the infringement would cause the patent holder irreparable harm.  
 
                                               
10 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170587 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
11 946 F. Supp.2d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
12 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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 Judge Reyna, writing for the Federal Circuit, upheld the denial of the injunction, 
but offered different reasoning. Though the Federal Circuit panel was divided on some 
issues, all three members of the panel concurred that “[t]o the extent that the district court 
applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs, it erred” (p. 1331). The 
court reasoned that the eBay framework “provides ample strength and flexibility for 
analyzing []RAND committed patents and industry standards in general”, and found no 
reason to create “a separate rule or analytical framework for addressing injunctions for 
[]RAND-committed patents” (pp. 1331-32). The court acknowledged that under the eBay 
framework, “a patentee subject to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing 
irreparable harm” (p. 1332). However, “an injunction may be justified where an infringer 
unilaterally refuses a []RAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same 
effect” (id.). With this in mind, the court went on to apply the eBay “irreparable harm” 
test and rejected Motorola’s request for an injunction.  
 
 Chief Judge Rader, dissenting-in-part, argued that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed regarding Apple’s conduct with respect to the acceptance of a FRAND license 
from Motorola (i.e., did Apple act in good faith or “hold out” by refusing to accept a 
FRAND license).  Accordingly, Judge Rader would have remanded the case for further 
fact finding on this issue (pp. 1333-34). Judge Prost, on the other hand, concurring-in-
part and dissenting-in-part, disagreed with the majority’s suggestion that an alleged 
infringer’s refusal to negotiate a license could serve as a basis for issuing an injunction on 
a FRAND-encumbered patent (p. 1342). She reasoned that while a potential licensee’s 
bad faith negotiation might justify an award of enhanced damages, the eBay “irreparable 
harm” test would nevertheless weigh against granting an injunction on a FRAND-
encumbered patent (id.). However, Judge Prost conceded that an injunction might be 
appropriate if the patentee were unable to collect the damages to which it is entitled, for 
example, if the potential licensee refuses to pay an adjudicated damage award or is 
beyond the reach of the court (p. 1343). 
2.  The ITC and Patent Exclusion Orders 
 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) is an independent federal agency 
responsible for protecting U.S. commerce by barring the importation of infringing goods. 
In recent years, the ITC has become a popular venue for patent infringement suits. The 
ITC has no authority to award monetary damages.  The principal remedy that the ITC 
awards is an exclusion order, which prohibits goods that are found to infringe a U.S. 
intellectual property right from entering the country.13 In this sense, exclusion orders 
granted by the ITC are similar to injunctions issued by U.S. courts. 
 
But because the ITC is not a court, it is not bound by Supreme Court precedent. 
Thus, the ITC is not required to adhere to the eBay factors when considering a request for 
an exclusion order.  However, in considering whether to grant an exclusion order, the 
ITC is required by its own governing statute to consider “the effect of such exclusion 
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, 
                                               
13 19 U.S.C. §337(a)(1)(A). 
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the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United 
States consumers”.14 This requirement has generally been referred to as the ITC’s “public 
interest” test. 
 
In several recent cases, the ITC has considered requests for exclusion orders 
against products infringing one or more FRAND-committed SEPs. In the dispute between 
Apple and Samsung,15 the ITC issued an exclusion order in 2013 prohibiting Apple from 
importing devices infringing certain Samsung FRAND-committed SEPs into the U.S. But 
in response, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), acting on behalf of the Obama 
administration, disapproved (thereby reversing) the ITC’s exclusion order against Apple, 
reasoning that the ITC did not act on the basis of a sufficient factual record regarding, 
inter alia, “information on the standards essential nature of the patent at issue … and the 
presence or absence of patent hold-up or reverse hold-up”.16  The USTR’s disapproval of 
the ITC’s exclusion order against Apple took many by surprise. In subsequent cases, the 
ITC has more extensively considered factors relating to SEPs when conducting its public 
interest analysis.17 
 
Several other U.S. federal agencies have expressed views regarding the ITC’s 
issuance of exclusion orders for FRAND-encumbered SEPs. In 2013, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a joint 
Policy Statement relating to the consideration of the pubic interest with respect to ITC 
exclusion orders.18 It states that “the remedy of an injunction or exclusion order may be 
inconsistent with the public interest … where an exclusion order based on a F/RAND-
encumbered patent appears to be incompatible with the terms of a patent holder’s existing 
F/RAND licensing commitment” (p. 6). In this Policy Statement, the DOJ and PTO 
acknowledge circumstances in which an injunction or exclusion order may be an 
appropriate remedy. These include cases in which the infringer refuses to accept the 
FRAND license being offered, refuses to pay a reasonable royalty, refuses to engage in 
negotiation to determine FRAND terms, or is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court that 
could award damages. 
 
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has made similar arguments regarding 
the circumstances under which the public interest would be served by the issuance of an 
ITC exclusion order against a product infringing a FRAND-committed SEP. In a written 
Statement to the ITC,19 the FTC reasoned that the ITC’s public interest factors “support 
                                               
14 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
15 In re Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music 
and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-794 
16 Letter from Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, U.S. Trade Representative to Hon. Irving A. 
Williamson, Aug. 3, 2013. 
17 Such cases include In re Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and 
Components Thereof, ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-868 (Jun. 13, 2014) (relating to Interdigital). 
18 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (DOJ-PTO). 2013. Policy Statement on 
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments. 
19  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Third Party U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Statement  
of the Public Interest on In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable  
Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 at 5 (Jun. 6, 
2012). 
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denial of an exclusion order unless the holder of the RAND-encumbered SEP has made a 
reasonable royalty offer” (p. 4). The FTC has also suggested that the ITC should consider 
ways to lessen the impact of exclusion orders in a manner that is supportive of the public 
interest.  Such methods might include delaying the effectiveness of exclusion orders in 
order to give the infringer time to design around the asserted patent, and carefully 
circumscribing the scope of orders to cover only infringing articles. 
3.  Injunctions and U.S. Antitrust Agencies 
 
The DOJ and FTC have each taken an interest in the propriety of parties bound by 
FRAND commitments seeking injunctive relief.  In 2011, the FTC suggested that under 
eBay, injunctive relief might not always be justified in the FRAND context, writing that 
“[a] prior [F]RAND commitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the 
injunction and ongoing royalties will not irreparably harm the patentee”.20 And in 2012, 
the DOJ approved three large patent acquisition transactions only after the involved 
parties (Apple, Google, and Microsoft) committed not to seek injunctions preventing the 
use of FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
 
 In late 2012 and 2013, the FTC brought two actions under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act to address suspected violations of FRAND commitments. In the first such action, the 
FTC investigated Robert Bosch GmbH in connection with its proposed acquisition of a 
firm called SPX.21 According to the complaint, SPX participated in an SDO developing 
standards for automotive cooling systems. Despite having made a FRAND commitment 
to the SDO, SPX asserted two patents covering the SDO’s standards against suspected 
infringers and then sought injunctive relief to prevent future sales of infringing products. 
The FTC argued that SPX’s attempt to obtain injunctive relief in the face of its FRAND 
commitment was coercive, and thereby constituted an unfair method of competition in 
violation of the Act. Bosch settled the action by committing that SPX would no longer 
seek injunctive relief in this context.	
 
The second such action was brought against Motorola Mobility and Google.22 In 
that case, Motorola (later acquired by Google) held patents essential to practice standards 
promulgated by IEEE, ITU, and ETSI. Motorola participated in, and made FRAND 
commitments to, each of these SDOs. Nevertheless, in separate suits asserting these 
patents against Apple and Microsoft, Motorola sought exclusion orders at the ITC and 
injunctions in federal court to prevent future sales of standards-compliant products, even 
though both defendants were allegedly willing to acquire licenses to Motorola’s patents. 
The FTC asserted that Motorola’s attempt to enjoin sales of Apple and Microsoft 
products using its standards-essential patents constituted an unfair method of competition 
in violation of Section 5. The dispute was settled after Google agreed not to seek 
injunctive relief against an infringer of FRAND-committed patents unless the infringer 
was beyond the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, stated in writing that it would not accept a 
                                               
20 Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition 235 (2011). 
21 Robert Bosch GmbH, 155 F.T.C. 713 (2013). 
22 In re. Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4410 (Jul. 23, 2013) (decision 
and order. 
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license of the patent, refused to enter into a license agreement determined by a court or 
arbitrator to comply with the FRAND requirement, or failed to provide written 
confirmation of an offer of a FRAND license. 
 
Despite these actions, there are signs that the Department of Justice in the Trump 
Administration may have a different view regarding injunctions and FRAND-
encumbered SEPs. In a recent speech, the head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division was 
critical of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple v. Motorola, and expressed skepticism 
in general about the denial of injunctive relief to SEP holders.23   
 
B. Injunctive Relief and FRAND in Europe: Huawei v. ZTE 
 
Under the national laws of many European countries, Germany in particular, 
injunctions are issued as a matter of right once a property owner (i.e., a patent holder) 
establishes an infringement of its property right.  However, this strong presumption in 
favor of injunctions is offset by the effect of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. In 
some cases, dominance may be conferred by patent rights, and SEPs in particular.  Thus, 
it is possible that a patent holder’s otherwise valid attempt to obtain an injunction against 
a product manufacturer could constitute a violation of Article 102 if the asserted patent is 
a FRAND-encumbered SEP. 
 
The analytical framework for assessing abuse of dominance with SEPs subject to 
FRAND commitments was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Huawei 
v. ZTE.24 In Huawei, the SEP holder sought an injunction against an infringer.  The ECJ 
held that if a SEP holder possesses market dominance, then in order to avoid violating 
Article 102, the SEP holder must comply with a series of procedural steps.  Likewise, in 
order to preserve its ability to challenge the SEP holder’s behavior under Article 102, the 
infringer must comply with a similar series of procedural steps.  The combination of 
these behavioral requirements has been referred to as the Huawei “choreography”.  The 
required steps in this choreography are summarized below: 
 
1. patentee must notify the defendant of the alleged infringement; 
2. defendant must show its willingness to license on FRAND terms; 
3. patentee must make a specific, written offer for a license on FRAND terms; 
4. defendant must diligently respond to that offer without delaying tactics; 
5. If defendant rejects the patentee’s offer, it must make a counter-offer on FRAND 
terms; and 
6. If patentee rejects the counter-offer, the defendant must provide appropriate 
security (including for past use) and be able to render an account of its acts of use. 
                                               
23 Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, Remarks that the USC Gould School of Law’s 
Center for Transnational Law and Business,  Nov. 10, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorneygeneral-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center 
24 Eur. Court of Justice, Case C-170/13 (2015). 
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In the few years since the Huawei decision, a number of cases in Germany and 
other jurisdictions have helped to clarify these requirements.  In several cases, including 
Sisvel v. Haier (Germany 2015), NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (Germany 2016), Saint Lawrence 
v. Vodafone (Germany 2016), and Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom (Germany 2016), 
the manufacturer/infringer failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in 
Huawei v. ZTE. These failures included failing to make a specific counter-offer and 
failing to post monetary security against the royalty demand.  As a result, the courts in 
these cases approved the entry of an injunction against the infringer.  In some of these 
cases, however (Sisvel v. Haier, St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom), these injunctions 
were stayed by appellate courts, which found that the SEP holders themselves may not 
have complied with the Huawei procedures.  In particular, though lower courts appeared 
to allow SEP holders to seek an injunction if their initial offers were not obviously non-
FRAND, the appellate courts in Germany required an affirmative finding that the offers 
were FRAND in order to support an injunction. 
 
C.   Injunctions in China 
 
The first notable SEP-related case in China was decided in 2013 and involved the 
enforcement of patents by InterDigital Corporation (IDC) against Chinese manufacturer 
Huawei. IDC was found to have abused its dominant position by demanding an 
unreasonably high royalty from Huawei and in enforcing its patents against Huawei both 
in China and abroad. The court held that IDC violated the Chinese Antimonopoly Law 
(AML) when it sought an injunction against Huawei, which had demonstrated a 
willingness to obtain a license on FRAND terms and acted in good faith during the 
license negotiation.  This case was generally viewed as indicating that Chinese courts 
would take a dim view of attempts by SEP holders to seek injunctions against potential 
willing licensees. 
 
This general view shifted beginning in 2016 when the Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) released a set of judicial interpretations relating to patent infringement cases.25  
Article 24 of the interpretations provides guidance regarding SEPs. In particular, it states 
that if a SEP holder deliberately fails to comply with its obligation to grant a FRAND 
license to a manufacturer, and the manufacturer is not clearly at fault, then the SEP 
holder should not be entitled to an injunction against the manufacturer.  There are, 
however, several limitations with respect to this interpretation.  First, it does not address 
the availability of injunctions under other circumstances, such as when both parties 
negotiated in good faith, both were acting in bad faith, or the patent holder was acting in 
good faith and the implementer was acting in bad faith. Moreover, the interpretation 
                                               
25 Interpretations (II) of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application 
of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (effective as of April 1, 2016), available at 
http://www.beijingeastip.com/type-news/interpretation-by-the-supreme-peoples-court-on-some-issues-
concerning-the-application-of-laws-in-the-trial-of-patent-infringement-dispute-cases-ii-judicial-
interpretation-2016-no-1-3/. 
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appears to relate only to recommended national and industrial standards, without 
mentioning compulsory governmental standards or voluntary international standards. 
 
Additional guidelines regarding patent infringement cases were issued by the 
Beijing High People’s Court in 2017.26 Articles 149-153 of these guidelines deal with 
patents disclosed in recommended national, industrial or local standards. Articles 152-
153 specifically set forth how injunctive relief should be awarded when neither party is at 
fault, or both parties are at fault, during FRAND licensing negotiations. The Beijing 
guidelines also provide that if neither party is at fault, the infringer must deposit the 
amount of its proposed royalty with the court in order to avoid an injunction.  
 
Article 152 sets forth a list of specific criteria that the court may use to assess 
whether the patent holder willfully violated its FRAND obligations, including the 
following: 
 
1. failing to notify the accused infringer of the infringement in writing and 
failing to specify the scope and manner of infringement; 
2. failing to provide patent information or specific licensing conditions in 
written form in accordance with business practices and trading customs, 
after the accused party explicitly expresses a willingness to engage in 
licensing negotiations; 
3. failing to provide the accused infringer with a time limit for reply in 
accordance with business practices and trading customs; 
4. obstructing or interrupting the licensing negotiation without justifiable 
reasons; 
5. alleging clearly unreasonable conditions during the negotiation, which 
results in failure to reach a licensing agreement. 
 
 
In March 2017, the Beijing IP Court granted an injunction to Chinese patent 
holder Iwncomm against Sony’s distribution of wireless handsets that allegedly infringed 
patents covering the Chinese WAPI standard for wireless networking. The court found 
that Sony acted in bad faith by stretching out licensing negotiations for six years (so-
called “reverse hold-up”). Among the factors that weighed against Sony were its 
attempted use of comparable licenses based on an international standard (i.e., not the 
Chinese standard at issue), and its unwillingness to sign a nondisclosure agreement 
before obtaining claim charts from Iwncomm.27 
 
Most recently, in January 2018, the Intermediate People’s Court in Shenzhen 
issued an injunction against Samsung’s sale of 4G telecommunications devices that 
                                               
26 Beijing High People’s Court Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination (Apr. 20, 2017) 
available at http://www.cpahkltd.com/EN/info.aspx?n=20170424155321600369 
27 A claim chart is a document that maps the particular features of a product to the specific patent 
claims that are alleged to be infringed.  Such charts are often quite detailed. 
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allegedly infringed two Huawei patents.28  As in the Iwncomm case, the court appears to 
have based its decision, at least in part, on the alleged bad faith behavior of the infringing 
party.  These cases, coupled with the recent interpretive guidance issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court and Beijing High People’s Court, clearly indicates a more permissive 
attitude toward injunctions in China. 
 
D. Private Waivers of Injunctive Relief 
 
Injunctive relief is a remedy available to private litigants, and as such may be 
waived by sophisticated parties acting without duress or anticompetitive intent. Such 
waivers occasionally appear in private contracts between commercial parties.29  Recently, 
such waivers have featured prominently in the standard-setting context. As noted in Part 
II.A.3 above, Apple, Google and Motorola each voluntarily committed not to seek 
injunctions under standards-essential patents in connection with DOJ approval of their 
patent-related acquisitions.  And in 2015, IEEE approved revisions to its internal policies 
to require its members to forego injunctive relief against manufacturers of products 
compliant with IEEE standards except in certain limited circumstances. These private 
waivers, if reflecting the desires of SDO participants, can effectively eliminate disputes 
over the use of injunctions in the SEP context. 
III. FRAND Royalty Disputes 
 
One of the most complex issues arising with respect to FRAND licensing is the 
royalty level that complies with a SEP holder’s commitment to grant a license on terms 
that are “fair and reasonable”.  As noted above, most SDOs offer little guidance regarding 
the actual FRAND royalty level.  Thus, the determination of FRAND royalty rates is 
typically left to bilateral negotiations among SEP holders and manufacturers of 
standardized products.  Not surprisingly, there is sometimes disagreement whether a 
royalty rate is compliant with the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment.  In some cases, a 
SEP holder and a manufacturer may disagree whether the royalty rate demanded by the 
SEP holder for such a license is FRAND, and the manufacturer may sue the SEP holder 
for breaching its FRAND commitment. In other cases, a SEP holder may sue a 
manufacturer for infringing its SEPs, and the manufacturer may raise as an affirmative 
defense the SEP holder’s obligation to grant the manufacturer a license on FRAND 
terms.  In both of these scenarios, one of the central questions is whether the royalty rate 
that the SEP holder sought to charge the manufacturer was FRAND. These questions 
have been handled somewhat differently among jurisdictions. 
 
                                               
28 At the time of this writing, a translation of the Shenzhen decision is not available.  A summary 
of the court’s reasoning was reported in Jacob Schindler, Huawei scores SEP injunction in Shenzhen suit 
against Samsung Electronics, IAM Blog, Jan. 11, 2018,  
29 E.g., Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719(1)(a) permits contracting parties to “provide for 
remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the 
measure of damages recoverable under this Article”. 
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A.  FRAND Royalties in the U.S. and the Georgia-Pacific Framework 
 
In the U.S., the assessment of damages in most civil cases, including patent and 
contract cases, is a question of “fact” reserved to the jury under the Seventh Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution.  Litigants may waive their right to a jury determination, but only 
if both parties agree to do so.  As a result, FRAND royalty determinations in U.S. cases 
have been a combination of judicial “bench” decisions and jury verdicts. 
 
Under the U.S. Patent Act, the principal measure of damages for patent 
infringement is a “reasonable royalty”.30  As a result, several courts that have calculated 
FRAND royalty rates have looked to traditional methodologies for determining 
reasonable royalty damages. The calculation of reasonable royalty damages in the U.S. 
has generally followed the 15-factor framework established in 1970 by Georgia-Pacific 
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.31 However, because this framework assumes that the patent 
holder and the infringer have no pre-existing relationship, and that the patent holder is not 
otherwise constrained in its ability to determine its royalty rate, many of the assumptions 
                                               
30 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2016) (first enacted in 1952). 
31 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).  The fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors are:  
 
1. The royalties received by the patent holder for licensing the patent, proving or tending to 
prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other similar patents. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, whether it is exclusive or nonexclusive, or restricted 
or non-restricted in terms of territory or customers. 
4. The patent holder’s established policy of maintaining its patent monopoly by licensing 
the use of the invention only under special conditions designed to preserve the monopoly. 
5. The commercial relationship between the patent holder and licensees, such as whether 
they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business or whether they are 
inventor and promoter. 
6. The effect of selling the patented article in promoting sales of other products of the 
licensee; the existing value of the invention to the patent holder as a generator of sales of 
non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or “convoyed” sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the patented product, its commercial success and its 
current popularity. 
9. The utility and advantages of the patented technology over any old modes or devices that 
had been used for achieving similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention, its character in the commercial embodiment owned 
and produced by the licensor, and the benefits to those who used it. 
11. The extent to which the infringer used the invention and any evidence probative of the 
value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or selling price that is customary in the particular business or in 
comparable businesses. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from any non-patented elements, manufacturing process, business risks or 
significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that the patent holder and a licensee would have agreed upon at the time the 
infringement began if they had reasonably and voluntarily tried to reach an agreement. 
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underlying the Georgia-Pacific analysis do not apply in cases involving FRAND-
encumbered SEPs. 
 
In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart of the Federal District Court for the 
Western District of Washington sought to determine both a reasonable royalty and a 
range of reasonable royalties for Motorola’s patents covering two industry standards.32 In 
doing so, Judge Robart looked first to the reasonable royalty damages analysis in 
Georgia-Pacific, including its hypothetical negotiation framework. He reasoned that the 
parties to a hypothetical negotiation would set RAND33 royalty rates by “looking at the 
importance of the SEPs to the standard and the importance of the standard and the SEPs 
to the products at issue” (p.19). However, he also noted that “[f]rom an economic 
perspective, a RAND commitment should be interpreted to limit a patent holder to a 
reasonable royalty on the economic value of its patented technology itself, apart from the 
value associated with incorporation of the patented technology into the standard” (id.) 
 
Ultimately, Judge Robart adopted a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific 
framework in which he changed twelve of the fifteen factors to take Motorola’s RAND 
commitment into account. After establishing this analytical framework, Judge Robart 
looked to several “comparable” sets of license agreements, including some patent pools, 
to evaluate the basis for Motorola’s RAND royalty rates. 
 
The RAND royalty rates determined by Judge Robart were significantly lower 
than the rates originally demanded by Motorola. For example, with respect to SEPs 
covering the H.264 audio-video encoding standard, Motorola initially demanded a royalty 
of 2.25% of the end price of Microsoft products embodying the standard. Thus, for a low-
end $500 computer, the per-unit royalty would have been $11.25. The court, in assessing 
the value of Motorola’s patents to the H.264 standard and the value of the standard to the 
overall products in which it was embodied, determined a FRAND royalty rate of 
$0.00555 per unit. Based on these results, Motorola’s initial royalty demand to Microsoft 
was more than 2,000 times higher than the “reasonable” royalty rate determined by the 
court. 
 
In Innovatio IP Ventures, Innovatio, a patent assertion entity (PAE) holding 
twenty-three SEPs covering the 802.11 Wi-Fi standards sent demand letters to hundreds 
of coffee shops, motels, supermarkets and other retail establishments that offered public 
Wi-Fi access (thereby allegedly infringing the SEPs), in each case seeking a modest 
monetary settlement.34 The case was consolidated and the court considered Innovatio’s 
proposed royalty of 6% of the end price of products such as wireless access points, 
laptops, tablets and bar code scanners, resulting in potential royalties ranging from $3.39 
to $36.90 per unit (pp. 74-75). In assessing the appropriate RAND royalty rate, Judge 
Holderman of the Northern District of Illinois largely followed the framework described 
in Microsoft for the determination of RAND royalties. In particular, he applied a 
                                               
32 Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233. 
33 Some SDOs use the term RAND in lieu of FRAND.  For purposes of this paper, these terms will 
be considered to be synonymous.  
34 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *38 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
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modified Georgia-Pacific analysis that simulates a hypothetical bilateral negotiation in 
the context of RAND obligations. After assessing the value of Innovatio’s SEPs, the 
court held that the appropriate FRAND royalty was only $0.0956 per unit, making 
Innovatio’s initial royalty proposals between 35 and 386 times higher than the 
adjudicated FRAND royalty rate. 
 
In Ericsson v. D-Link,35 the FRAND royalty rate was determined by a jury.  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit, on appeal, was limited to reviewing the trial court’s instructions to 
the jury.  In the appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the jury verdict based, 
in part, on the district court’s instruction to apply the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors 
without modification. The Federal Circuit affirmed that, “[i]n a case involving RAND-
encumbered patents, many of the Georgia-Pacific factors simply are not relevant; many 
are even contrary to RAND principles”.36 The Federal Circuit noted several respects in 
which the Georgia-Pacific factors were both irrelevant and contrary to the RAND 
commitment under consideration. Thus, like Judge Robart in Microsoft, the Federal 
Circuit criticized the use of several specific Georgia-Pacific factors when considering 
royalties subject to RAND commitments.  
 
The Federal Circuit in Ericsson v. D-Link made several other important rulings. In 
particular, it held that an accused infringer seeking to raise the issue of hold-up to a jury 
must introduce actual evidence of the SEP holder’s hold-up behavior. Because this 
evidence was not introduced by the alleged infringer, the court was justified in not 
instructing the jury on the question of hold-up.37 The court used similar reasoning with 
respect to the question of royalty stacking and held that actual evidence of stacking must 
be introduced in order for the question to be considered by the jury.38 
 
B.  Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Royalty Determinations 
 
In most of the cases discussed in Part III.A above, the courts determined FRAND 
royalties in a “bottom-up” manner.  That is, they calculated the royalty due to the patent 
holder based primarily on the alleged value of the patents in suit, without regard to the 
overall number or value of patents covering the standard in question or the results 
reached by other courts addressing the same standards.  In fact, as the Federal Circuit 
emphasized in Ericsson v. D-Link, a court may not even instruct the jury regarding 
royalty stacking without actual evidence of stacking.39  When such bottom-up approaches 
are used, royalties due to individual patent holders are determined in an uncoordinated 
manner independently of one another, and the total royalty burden associated with a 
standard emerges only as the sum of its individual components. The problem with such 
                                               
35 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
36 Id. at 1230. 
37 Id. at 1234. 
38 Id. at 1234-35. The author has questioned this analysis and conclusion on the basis that it could 
lead SEP holders to engage in a “race to the courthouse” in order to be the first to seek and collect damages 
from particular manufacturers.  See Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Royalty Stacking and Collective Action, 
3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 6, Mar. 2015.  
39 773 F.3d at 1234-35. 
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bottom-up approaches is that courts may use different royalty criteria and factors case by 
case, even when patents covering the same features of the same standard are involved, 
thus yielding inconsistent and potentially excessive results. For example, as shown in 
Table 1, in 2013 and 2014, five different U.S. district courts calculated royalties for a 
total of 35 SEPs covering IEEE’s Wi-Fi standards.   
 
TABLE 1 
U.S. Litigated FRAND Royalty Determinations for 802.11 (Wi-Fi) Standard-Essential Patents 
Case Court (year)40 Royalty 
Microsoft v. Motorola41 W.D. Wash. (2013) $0.035 per unit 
In re Innovatio42 N.D. Ill. (2013) $0.0956 per unit 
Ericsson v. D-Link43 E.D. Tex. (2013) $0.15 per unit 
Realtek v. LSI44 N.D. Cal. (2014) 0.12% of net sales 
CSIRO v. Cisco45 E.D. Tex. (2014) Up to $1.90 per unit 
Source: Jason R. Bartlett and Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader 
Save the Internet of Things, 36 REVIEW OF LITIGATION 285, 288 (2017). 
 
The aggregate royalty for these 35 SEPs amounted to approximately 4.5% of the 
total sale price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router. Yet it has been estimated that there are 
approximately 3,000 patents covering the Wi-Fi standard. If the royalty for each of these 
patents were calculated in a similarly uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate 
patent royalty on a Wi-Fi router could easily surpass the product’s total selling price by at 
least an order of magnitude. And even if, as suggested by some commentators, this effect 
might be reduced because many of these SEPs are held by the same large firms,46 the total 
number of firms holding SEPs covering Wi-Fi is still significantly larger than the number 
of adjudicated cases to date. 
 
Given the growing recognition of these issues, commentators, courts and policy 
makers have become increasingly attracted to mechanisms that take into account the 
aggregate royalty burden associated with a standard when considering the royalties owed 
to any particular patent holder. Thus, as noted by the European Commission in a recent 
communication regarding SEPs, “an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation. 
Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing 
                                               
40 Cited decisions are to the federal district court decision in which the royalty was determined.  
Subsequent proceedings and appeals are not listed. 
41 Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *297–98. 
42 No. 1:11CV-09308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *183 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).. 
43 Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 6:10-CV-473, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110585 at *72 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 6, 2013),   aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part by Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
44 Jury Verdict Form, Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp. & Agere Sys., LLC, No. 12-CV-
3451, Dkt. No. 324 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014).  
45 CSIRO v. Cisco Sys., No. 6:11-cv-343, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107612, at *51 (E.D. Tex. July 
23, 2014). 
46 See Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, An Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Decision 
in Ericsson v. D-Link, 3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 6, Mar. 2015. 
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the overall added value of the technology.”47 Royalty calculation methodologies that seek 
to address these issues can broadly be termed “top-down” approaches because they look 
first to the overall level of royalties associated with a standard and then allocate a portion 
of this total to individual patent holders.48 Top-down approaches implicitly recognize 
that, when multiple patents cover a single standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder 
will necessarily affect the rates that the other SEP holders are able to obtain from a single 
manufacturer. Top-down royalty approaches offer the following advantages to the parties 
and to the market as a whole: 
 
• Accuracy – the total value attributable to a standard is computed deliberately, 
not through the uncoordinated aggregation of independent, serial cases 
• Fairness to patentees – every patent holder obtains its fair share of the total 
royalty attributable to the standard  
• Fairness to licensees – licensees are not subject to royalty stacking with 
multiple suits by different patent holders 
• Precedent – aggregate royalties are already calculated in patent pools and this 
methodology is well-understood 
 
The court in Innovatio was among the earliest to adopt a top-down methodology 
to calculate FRAND royalties. It first determined, based on expert testimony, that the 
average profit margin on the sale of a Wi-Fi chip during the relevant period was 12.1%. It 
then multiplied this percentage by the average price of a Wi-Fi chip ($14.85), yielding an 
average total profit of $1.80 per chip. The court reasoned that a chip manufacturer would 
spend no more than its total profit on patent royalties, and therefor equated the aggregate 
royalty for all Wi-Fi SEPs to the chip maker’s total profit. It thus held that the aggregate 
per-product royalty attributable to the Wi-Fi standard should be $1.80, and then 
apportioned a fraction of this total to the plaintiff.49 
 
In Samsung v. Apple Japan50, the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court held 
that the aggregate royalty burden for the 3G UMTS standard should not exceed 5%. It 
then allocated a portion of this total royalty to Samsung’s asserted UMTS-essential patent 
based on the total number of SEPs likely to be essential to the standard. Unlike the court 
in Innovatio, the Japanese court relied on public statements and informal agreements 
among industry participants supporting an aggregate 5% royalty cap for the UMTS 
standard. Taking this evidence into account, the court reasoned that “many owners of the 
UMTS standard essential patents support the 5% aggregate royalty cap with a view to 
preventing the aggregate cap from being excessively high.” 
 
                                               
47 European Commission,  Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee Setting out the EU approach to Standard 
Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712 final. 
48 For a more detailed discussion of Top-Down approaches, see Jorge L. Contreras, Aggregated 
Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations: Revisiting ‘Joint Negotiation’, 62(4) ANTITRUST 
BULLETIN 690-709 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051502 
49 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *83. 
50 Apple Japan Godo Kaisha v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., IP High Court of Japan, 2013 (Ne) 
10043 (May 16, 2014). 
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Likewise, the UK High Court (Patent) in Unwired Planet v. Huawei51 applied a 
top-down methodology to calculate FRAND royalties due to the SEP holder. Under the 
top down methodology used by the court, the FRAND royalty equals T x S, where T is 
the total aggregate SEP royalty burden of a particular standard on a product (i.e., the 
percentage of a smartphone’s price that should be charged for all patents covering the 
standard), and S is the share of that aggregate royalty that is allocable to the SEP holder 
(Unwired Planet).  To calculate “T”, the court considered eight public statements made 
by Ericsson (the original owner of the patents asserted by Unwired Planet) and other 
holders of SEPs covering the relevant standards.  He then calculated “S”, Unwired 
Planet’s share of the relevant SEP value, using a variety of counting and filtering 
methodologies proposed by the parties’ experts, including a filter for the likely 
essentiality of the patents in the asserted portfolio.  The court used the resulting royalty 
rate as a cross-check to verify a more traditional comparables-based royalty calculation 
methodology.52 
  
And most recently, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in 
TCL v. Ericsson53 used a top-down approach to assess FRAND royalties for a portfolio of 
patents covering the 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications standards. Like the 
courts in Unwired Planet and Apple Japan, the California court based the aggregate rates 
for these standards on various public statements and press releases made by Ericsson. 
These statements supported an aggregate royalty of 5% on the 2G and 3G standards and a 
rate between 6% and 10% on the 4G standard.54 While the court acknowledges that this 
method “is not perfect”,55 one of its merits is its dependence on statements made by 
Ericsson itself to induce the market to adopt standards covered by its own SEPs.56 The 
court’s endorsement of a top-down royalty calculation methodology in this case, 
following the similar endorsements in Japan and the UK, may suggest that top-down 
methodologies are gaining ground on the “hypothetical negotiation” approaches 
discussed in Part III.A above 
                                               
51 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017). 
52 The court in Unwired Planet  offers two possible methods of calculating the FRAND royalty, 
one based on an analysis of comparable license rates, the other based on a top-down approach. In the 
comparables comparison, the fact that Unwired Planet obtained each of its asserted SEPs from Ericsson 
was convincing proof that Ericsson’s licenses qualified as sufficiently comparable, while most other 
licenses (i.e., those not involving Ericsson) were found not to be suitable comparables. After identifying an 
appropriate set of comparable licenses, the court reasons that the appropriate FRAND royalty rate for 
Unwired Planet’s SEP portfolio was the rate charged by Ericsson for its own SEP portfolio, scaled to 
represent Unwired Planet’s smaller number of patents.   
53 TCL Communications v. Ericsson, Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(C.D. Cal., Dec. 21, 2017, SACV 14-341 JVS (DFMx) and CV 15-2370 JVS (DFMx)). 
54 Id. at *19-26. 
55 Id. at *25. 
56 Id.  See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other 
Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479 (2015) (discussing inducement and “market reliance” on FRAND 
commitments). 
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C.  Competition versus Contractual Approaches: Unwired Planet 
 
In Unwired Planet v. Huawei,57Justice Colin Birss of the UK High Court (Patents) 
made several important observations and rulings tied to EU competition law principles.  
First, Justice Birss rules, as a matter of law, that there is a single royalty rate that qualifies 
as FRAND for any given set of SEPs and products. This approach runs counter to the 
FRAND range computed in U.S. cases such as Microsoft v. Motorola.  This being said, 
he also concludes that it would not be an abuse of dominance under TFEU 102 or the 
CJEU’s holding in Huawei v. ZTE for a SEP holder to offer a rate that is different from 
the precise FRAND rate, so long as it is not excessively so. That is, an abuse of 
dominance will not be found unless an offer “is so far above FRAND as to act to disrupt or 
prejudice the negotiations themselves”.58  
 
Justice Birss also addresses the behavior of the potential licensee in FRAND 
negotiations.  If the licensee engages in deliberate delay tactics or other unreasonable 
behavior to avoid entering into a license (hold-out or reverse hold-up), it is less likely that 
the SEP holder will be found to possess a dominant position for competition law 
purposes.59 
 
 
D.  Global Licenses and FRAND Rates 
 
In Unwired Planet, Unwired Planet offered Huawei a worldwide license under its 
asserted SEPs.  Huawei responded that it only wished to negotiate a license under 
Unwired Planet’s UK patents.  In evaluating the reasonableness of Unwired Planet’s 
worldwide license offer, Justice Birss observed that “the vast majority” of SEP licenses in 
the industry, including all of the comparable licenses introduced at trial, were granted on 
a worldwide basis. He then observed that Unwired Planet’s patents were issued in forty-
two countries, while Huawei’s operations extended to fifty-one countries.  Against this 
backdrop, he concluded that “a licensor and licensee acting reasonably and on a willing 
basis would agree on a worldwide licence”.60  In contrast, country-by-country licensing 
would be “madness”,61 and that Huawei’s insistence on a UK-only license could not be 
considered FRAND. Accordingly, the court ruled that, under these facts, a FRAND 
license is necessarily a worldwide license. 
 
The global scope of the license determined in Unwired Planet invites national 
courts to set royalty rates for SEPs across the globe.62 Will the first court to hear a 
particular case now try to resolve the worldwide dispute between the parties?  Will the 
                                               
57 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017). 
58 Id. at ¶765. 
59 Id. at ¶806(12). 
60 Id. at ¶543. 
61 Id. at ¶544. 
62 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition 
and FRAND Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, 16 ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
August, 2017. 
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FRAND rates set by a particular national court be respected by courts in other 
jurisdictions evaluating damages claims for past infringement, or will each national court 
feel compelled to conduct its own FRAND royalty calculation? It is possible that the 
willingness of judges in particular jurisdictions to set favorable (high) worldwide 
FRAND rates will begin to attract patent holders to those jurisdictions, much as U.S. 
patent holders were once attracted to the patent-friendly District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas.63  By the same token, jurisdictions that gain reputations for setting 
unfavorable (low) FRAND rates may attract implementers to their courts. Will a new 
“race to the bottom” thus emerge, in which litigants seek out the national courts most 
likely to produce judgments in their favor?64 These issues will need to be addressed 
internationally and, ideally, in a coordinated fashion in the near future. 
IV. Non-Discrimination 
 
The non-discrimination (ND) prong of the FRAND commitment is important, but 
has received far less attention from courts and commentators than royalty disputes.  The 
most thorough recent discussions of non-discrimination appears in Unwired Planet v. 
Huawei and TCL v. Ericsson. 
 
A. Similarly-Situated Licensees 
 
There is a general consensus that in order to comply with the non-discrimination 
prong of the FRAND commitment, a SEP holder must treat “similarly situated” licensees 
in a similar manner.65  Several commentators have understood this constraint to allow a 
SEP holder to charge different royalty rates to implementers based on their size or market 
share (often with the understanding that larger players are likely to sell more licensed 
products and thus pay higher levels of royalties).  In Unwired Planet, the court reasons 
that a FRAND royalty rate should be set based on the value of the licensed patents, not on 
the size of other characteristics of the licensee (¶ 175).  Thus, “all licensees who need the 
same kind of licence will be charged the same kind of rate” (id.) and “[s]mall new entrants 
are entitled to pay a royalty based on the same benchmark as established large entities” (¶ 
806(8)).   
 
Likewise, in TCL v. Ericsson, Judge Selna concludes that similarly situated firms 
are “all firms reasonably well-established in the world market” [for telecommunications 
                                               
63 The reign of the E.D.Tex. may be coming to an end following the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 581 U.S.  __ (2017). 
64  See Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many 
Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, 16 ANTITRUST SOURCE, August, 2017 (discussing the 
implications of global FRAND resolution in a single court). 
65 For a detailed discussion of the non-discrimination prong of FRAND, see Jorge L. Contreras & 
Anne Layne-Farrar, Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, Ch. 12 (Jorge L. 
Contreras, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017). 
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products].66  The court expressly excludes from this group “local kings” – firms that sell 
most of their products in a single country (e.g., India’s Karbonn and China’s Coolpad).67  
The firms that the court finds to be similarly situated to TCL are Apple, Samsung, 
Huawei, LG, HTC and ZTE.68 Ericsson argued that Apple and Samsung are not similar to 
TCL given their greater market shares and brand recognition, but the court rejects this 
argument, reasoning that “the prohibition on discrimination would mean very little if the 
largest, most profitable firms could always be a category unto themselves simply because 
they were the largest and most profitable firms”.69 
 
B. Hard-Edged Non-Discrimination 
  
In Unwired Planet, Justice Birss next asks what happens if, after a FRAND rate is 
agreed between a SEP holder and an implementer, the implementer discovers that the 
SEP holder has, previously or subsequently, granted more favorable terms (i.e., a lower 
royalty rate) to another “similarly situated” implementer? Has the SEP holder violated its 
nondiscrimination commitment?  Interestingly, the court rules that a SEP licensee cannot 
challenge a license granted to it on FRAND terms if it later discovers that a similarly-
situated licensee is paying a lower rate for the same patents unless the difference would 
“distort competition” between the two licensees.70  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
rejects the notion that the ND prong of FRAND implies a “hard-edged” obligation that 
places an absolute ceiling on the rate that a SEP holder may charge to other licensees.  It 
justifies this reasoning under competition law principles, noting that a competition law 
violation would not occur without a competitive distortion.  This reasoning seemingly 
conflates the competition law effects of violating a FRAND commitment, and the private 
“contractual” meaning of the FRAND commitment itself.  Whether other courts will 
adopt this competition-based reasoning remains to be seen. 
 
Perhaps following the UK court’s lead, in TCL v. Ericsson, Ericsson argued that 
in order for an instance of discrimination to violate its FRAND commitment, the 
discrimination must have the effect of “impairing the development of standards”.71 But 
Judge Selna takes a different view, holding that discrimination in violation of a FRAND 
commitment can be found so long as an individual firm is harmed.  He expressly rejects 
the application of a competition-based standard, which requires harm to competition 
rather than harm to a competitor, to the analysis of a FRAND commitment.72 In this 
respect, courts in the UK and U.S. have diverged.  Given that both the Unwired Planet 
and TCL decisions have been appealed, it remains to be seen whether this trans-Atlantic 
gap will continue. 
 
                                               
66 TCL v. Ericsson, slip op. at 56. 
67 Id. at 59. 
68 Id. at 58. 
69 Id. at 61. 
70 Unwired Planet at ¶ 501. 
71 TCL v. Ericsson, slip op. at 61.  
72 Id. at 91. 
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C. Level Discrimination 
 
In addition to the questions addressed in these cases, there are several additional 
issues concerning the non-discrimination prong of FRAND.  One of the most hotly 
debated of these is whether a FRAND commitment requires a SEP holder to license all 
applicants, or whether SEP holders may refuse to license certain categories of potential 
licensees (usually “upstream” component vendors) so that they may instead license other 
categories of licensees (usually “downstream” product vendors that purchase components 
from upstream vendors). This approach is largely motivated by the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion, under which a patent holder may collect a royalty only once per patented 
article. Thus, if a standardized technology is implemented in a chip, the SEP holder may 
collect a royalty either from the manufacturer of the chip, the assembler of the board on 
which the chip resides, the producer of the smartphone in which the board is installed or 
the user of the smart phone that utilizes the chip.  But it cannot collect royalties from 
more than one of these parties in the supply chain.  The SEP is “exhausted” once a 
product is sold by an authorized licensee, and the SEP holder cannot collect royalties 
from further downstream users of the patented technology.73 
 
There is thus a significant debate regarding the ability of SEP holders, under their 
FRAND commitments, to refuse to grant licenses to upstream component manufacturers 
who seek SEP licenses.  Courts and commentators are divided on this issue. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Microsoft v. Motorola that a SEP holder, in 
its declarations to the ITU, promised to “grant a license to an unrestricted number of 
applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis”.74 This statement implies that such 
level discrimination is not permissible. Likewise, in a 2016 remedial order against 
Qualcomm, the Korean Fair Trade Commission required that Qualcomm grant FRAND 
licenses under its SEPs to any component manufacturer requesting one.75 A similar 
commitment to universal access was adopted by the IEEE in recent amendments to its 
intellectual property policy.76 
 
But others have argued that the “non-discrimination” prong of FRAND does not 
require SEP holders to offer licenses to every applicant, but only to avoid discrimination 
                                               
73 From a purely economic standpoint, the level at which a SEP holder elects to license its SEPs 
should not matter, so long as the SEP holder is free to adjust its royalty rate based on the level at which it is 
licensing.  For example, a 1% royalty on a $500 smart phone yields the same amount as a 20% royalty on a 
$10 chip (i.e., $5.00).  It is unlikely that a chip vendor and a smart phone vendor would be viewed as 
“similarly situated”, making this form of differential pricing permissible under the non-discrimination 
prong of FRAND.  By the same token, it might be unreasonable for a chip vendor to insist on paying only 
the 1% royalty paid by the smart phone vendor, given the very different markets in which they operate.  
This is in contrast to applying the same 1% royalty to all smart phone vendors, whether they sell their end 
units for $100 or $800 – at least according to the court in TCL v. Ericsson, producers at the same market 
tier should be considered “similarly situated”.  
74 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012, p.884). 
75 Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Press Release– KFTC Imposes Sanctions Against Qualcomm’s Abuse of SEPs 
of Mobile Communications – Imposes 1.03 Trillion Won, the Highest Penalty Surcharge Ever Handed to 
an Individual Company by the KFTC and Remedies on Unfair Business Models (December 28, 2016). 
76 Inst. Electrical & Electronics Engineers, Inc. IEEE Standards Board Bylaws (December 2016), 
Sec. 6.2(b). 
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within the class of applicants that the SEP holder chooses to license. SEP holders who 
refuse to license component vendors have argued that by instead licensing such 
component vendors’ downstream customers, they have, in effect, “indirectly licensed” 
the component vendors, and that refusing to the license component vendors does not 
discriminate against competitors.77 In other words, so long as no component vendors 
receive licenses, no one component maker is placed at a competitive disadvantage. This 
approach was seemingly validated by the district court in Ericsson v. D-Link, which held 
that Ericsson did not violate its non-discrimination covenant by offering licenses only to 
vendors of “fully compliant” products and refusing to license chip and component 
vendors.78 
V.  Global Competition Enforcement and Guidance 
 
In addition to the private litigation discussed above, antitrust and competition 
authorities around the world have actively been issuing guidance regarding SEP licensing 
and enforcement and bringing enforcement actions to remedy suspected abuses connected 
with the licensing of SEPs.79 
A.  India 
 
In India, Ericsson has since 2011 been engaged in a series of SEP infringement 
actions against Indian and Chinese manufacturers of mobile communication devices. 
Courts hearing these cases have awarded damages and, in some cases, injunctive relief 
against these manufacturers.  In response to these actions, several of the alleged 
infringers filed complaints with the Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging, 
inter alia, that by bringing these infringement actions, Ericsson abused a dominant 
position created by its SEPs.  As of this writing, no substantive ruling has been made as 
to these issues. 
 
B.  China 
 
There are a number of regulatory and enforcement bodies in China with an active 
interest in standardization: the Standards Administration of China (SAC), which serves as 
China’s principal standard-setting body, the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC), which has promulgated regulations on abuse of dominance in the IPR 
field under China’s Antimonopoly Law (AML),80 and the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), which has responsibility for enforcement of the AML. 
 
                                               
77 See Ericsson v. D-Link (E.D. Tex. 2013, p.*80) (“By licensing end product manufacturers, 
Ericsson believed it was indirectly licensing chip manufacturers.”).  
78 Id. at *82). 
79 See also Section II.A.3, above, relating to U.S. enforcement agency actions against parties 
seeking injunctions under FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
80 Regulation on the Prohibition of Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition by Abusing 
Intellectual Property Rights (Apr. 2015). 
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In 2013, NDRC initiated an investigation of InterDigital Corporation’s (IDC) 
practices regarding SEP licensing, following litigation between IDC and Huawei.  IDC 
was alleged to discriminate in its licensing practices against Chinese manufacturers and 
otherwise abuse its dominant position.  The investigation was resolved in 2014 with 
IDC’s commitment to discontinue various challenged practices. 
 
In 2013, NDRC also initiated an investigation of Qualcomm for abuse of 
dominance, including discriminatory and excessive SEP pricing, and impermissible 
bundling of SEPs and non-SEPs.  In 2015 NDRC imposed a fine on Qualcomm of 
approximately US$975 million and also ordered Qualcomm to cease certain 
anticompetitive practices in China. 
 
C.  Korea 
 
The Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has been active in monitoring and 
regulating SEP licensing in Korea for several years.  In 2014, the KFTC issued Amended 
Guidelines Regarding the Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (effective 23 
Mar 2016), which established several categories of suspect activity pertaining to SEPs.  
Potential abuses by SEP holders include seeking injunctive relief against a willing 
licensee and unreasonably refusing to license on FRAND terms.  The Guidelines also 
focus on conduct by non-practicing entities (NPEs).  With regard to SEPs, potential 
abuses by NPEs include imposing excessive licensing fees, refusing to honor prior 
FRAND commitments on SEPs and “privateering” (acquiring SEPs from operating 
companies for the purpose of enforcing them against others, while the operating 
companies retain some financial interest in the outcome of the enforcement). 
 
The KFTC has also brought two major enforcement actions relating to SEP 
licensing against Qualcomm. The first, in 2009, resulted in a fine of approximately 
US$208 million for allegedly overcharging chip customers for software code.  The 
second action, which concluded in 2016, involved allegations that Qualcomm refused to 
license chip manufacturers in violation of its FRAND obligations, engaged in unfair 
licensing practices relating to its SEPs, and unfairly demanded royalty-free grant-back 
licenses from its licensees. The action resulted in a fine against Qualcomm of 
approximately US$853 million.81 
 
D.  Taiwan 
 
The most recent enforcement action against Qualcomm to result in a significant 
penalty was brought by the Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission. It imposed a fine of 
approximately US$774 million against Qualcomm for allegedly exercising a monopoly 
                                               
81 Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Press Release– KFTC Imposes Sanctions Against Qualcomm’s Abuse of SEPs 
of Mobile Communications – Imposes 1.03 Trillion Won, the Highest Penalty Surcharge Ever Handed to 
an Individual Company by the KFTC and Remedies on Unfair Business Models (December 28, 2016). 
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position in the market for wireless chips, licensing its technology in violation of antitrust 
law, and harming competition through its overall business model. 
 
E.  Japan 
 
Agencies in Japan have been particularly active in developing policies around 
SEPs and FRAND licensing.  In January 2016, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) 
amended its 2007 guidelines interpreting how the Antimonopoly Act (AMA) applies to 
intellectual property.82 The amended guidelines contain significant discussion of SEPs, 
particularly pointing out that a SEP holder likely violates the AMA if it refuses to grant a 
license, or seeks an injunction against, a “willing licensee”.  Moreover, the guidelines 
define a willing licensee as any entity that pursues "licensing negotiations in good faith in 
light of the normal business practices", even if that entity has challenged the patent’s 
validity, infringement or essentiality.  
 
The Japan Patent Office (JPO) has also been active in developing policy around 
SEPs. In March 2018, the JPO published a draft “Guide to Licensing Negotiations 
involving Standard Essential Patents”.83  The comprehensive document outlines the 
processes and procedures that the JPO identifies as constituting “good faith” negotiation 
over FRAND licensing.  In addition, the JPO has announced that it will expand its 
existing “Hantei” service, in which the JPO offers advisory opinions regarding the 
coverage of specified products by Japanese patents, to assess whether specified standards 
may be covered by Japanese patents.84 
 
F.  European Union 
 
The European Commission has initiated a number of investigations and actions 
with respect to suspected violations of EU competition law in connection with standard-
setting and SEP licensing and enforcement. These include past investigations of 
Samsung, Rambus and Qualcomm.85 In January 2018, the Commission imposed a fine of 
approximately $1.2 billion (EUR 997 million) on Qualcomm for making payments to a 
                                               
82 http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines.files/IPGL_Frand.pdf  
83 https://www.jpo.go.jp/iken/pdf/180308_hyoujun/sep_guide_draft_en.pdf.  Public comments on 
the draft Guide will be accepted until April 10, 2018, after which the JPO is expected to release a final 
version of the Guide. 
84 Satoshi Watanabe, Japanese government publishes the draft of users guide for HANTEI on SEP, 
Japan Intel. Prop. News, Feb. 18, 2018, http://japanip.blogspot.hk/2018/02/japanese-government-publishes-
draft-of.html.  As of this writing, an English version of this proposal was not available. 
85 A discussion of each of these cases is beyond the scope of this paper.  For such a discussion, see 
Damien Geradin, European Union Competition law, Intellectual Property Law and Standardization, in 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND 
PATENTS, Ch. 6 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017); and Nicolas Petit, EU Competition 
Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: 
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, Ch. 17 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017). 
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large customer (Apple) in exchange for its agreement not to purchase baseband chips 
from Qualcomm’s rivals.86 
 
In November 2017, the European Commission issued a long-awaited 
Communication regarding SEPs.87 The Communication was issued in response to a 
general concern within Europe regarding the suitability of existing legal and regulatory 
frameworks to handle the growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G wireless 
communications. The Communication covers four general areas: transparency of SDO 
SEP disclosures, FRAND licensing, injunctions and open source code. 
 
With respect to transparency, the Commission makes several suggestions 
regarding improvements to SDO SEP disclosure databases, including enhancing 
accuracy, detail and searchability of the SEP information that is currently housed in SDO 
databases. The Commission also responded to frequent criticism of over-declaration of 
SEPs in SDO databases by suggesting that the essentiality of SEPs be verified through an 
independent third party. This suggestion has been met with some skepticism in the 
industry, as the cost of such validation would likely be significant, and no clear model for 
addressing such cost has been proposed. 
 
With respect to FRAND royalties, the Commission emphasized that licensing 
terms should bear a clear relationship to the economic value of the patented technology, 
and that this value should be irrespective of the market success of the product which is 
unrelated to the patented technology.  Moreover, as noted above,88 the Commission noted 
that the value of an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation, and that parties 
must take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing the overall 
added value of the technology. The Communication also briefly discusses the non-
discrimination prong of FRAND and confirms that cross-licensing requirements and 
patent pools, in certain industries, should be acceptable. 
 
In terms of enforcement and injunctive relief, the Commission acknowledges the 
binding effect of the ECJ’s decision in Huawei v. ZTE as well as the proportionality 
principle established under Article 3(2) of the EU IPR Enforcement Directive89 (specifically 
“the requirement to ensure that injunctive relief is effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive”). It appears that the Commission, by referencing “the broad impact an 
injunction may have on businesses, consumers and on the public interest” may be 
attempting to introduce a “public interest” element to European injunctive relief 
decisions, along the lines of the public interest factor under the U.S. eBay framework.90 In 
addition, the Communication clarifies that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an 
                                               
86 European Commission, Press Release - Commission Fines Qualcomm €997 million for abuse of 
dominant market position (24 Jan. 2018). 
87 European Commission,  Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee Setting out the EU approach to Standard 
Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712 final. 
88 See discussion of top-down royalty determinations, Section III.B. 
89 Directive 2004/48/EC of 29.4.2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 195 
of 2.6.2004, p. 16. 
90 See Section II.A.1, above. 
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appropriate means for resolving FRAND disputes, and that no special rules should be 
applied to the assertion of SEPs by non-practicing entities. 
 
The Communication concludes with a brief discussion of the interaction between 
SDO processes and open source code community projects, and seeks to encourage further 
collaboration between these two communities. 
 
G.  United States 
 
The U.S. FTC has initiated a number of competition-based enforcement actions 
relating to SEP licensing.  These have included actions against Dell, Rambus, Negotiated 
Data Solutions (N-Data), Unocal, Bosch and Google/Motorola.91 Most recently, in late 
2016, the FTC brought suit against Qualcomm in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California92 alleging, among other things, that Qualcomm violated the antitrust 
laws by linking the sale of its baseband chips to SEP licenses, that it refused to license 
rival chipmakers under its SEPs, and that an exclusive arrangement with a major 
customer was intended to foreclose competition and market entry.  FTC Commissioner 
Maureen Ohlhausen filed a dissenting statement objecting to the initiation of the suit.93  
The case was still at an early stage as of this writing. 
 
Given that the principal U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies are led by political 
appointees, it is not uncommon for the priorities of these agencies to change when 
administrations change.  Such a change appears to be under way at the U.S. Department 
of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ).  Whereas, as noted above, the U.S. FTC continues to 
pursue allegedly anticompetitive conduct in the standard-setting arena, and the DOJ has 
previously taken an active role in policing potentially abusive conduct by SEP holders, a 
recent speech by Makan Delrahim, the new Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Antitrust Division,94 indicates that unilateral conduct by SEP holders may no longer be an 
enforcement priority of the current administration. Rather, he suggests that greater 
scrutiny may be leveled at SDOs and implementers acting collectively. In particular, 
concerted actions such as the amendment of SDO policies in a manner that is unfavorable 
to SEP holders may warrant particular scrutiny. The full implications of this potential 
policy shift at DOJ remain to be seen.  Interestingly, at least one FTC Commissioner has 
                                               
91 A discussion of each of these cases is beyond the scope of this paper.  For such a discussion, see 
Renata B. Hesse & Frances Marshall, U.S. Antitrust Aspects of FRAND Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, Ch. 16 
(Jorge L. Contreras, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017).  
92 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., Case 5:17-cv-00220 (N.D. Cal. Filed Jan. 17, 2017) 
93 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen in the Matter of Qualcomm, Inc. 
(Jan. 17, 2017). 
94 Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, Remarks that the USC Gould School of Law’s 
Center for Transnational Law and Business,  Nov. 10, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorneygeneral-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center 
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issued what appears to be a response to AAG Delrahim, reaffirming the need for federal 
agencies to police patent hold-up and other anticompetitive unilateral conduct.95 
 
Conclusion 
 
Disputes over standards-essential patents have become global, often involving 
simultaneous litigation in North America, Europe and Asia. But while many of the parties 
are the same in actions around the world, courts and governmental agencies in different 
jurisdictions have begun to develop distinctive approaches to some of these issues.  Thus, 
while areas of convergence exist, national laws continue to diverge on important issues 
such as the availability of injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs, the appropriate 
method for calculating FRAND royalties, the competition implications of violating a 
FRAND commitment, and the contours of the FRAND non-discrimination obligation.  
International harmonization, while a worthy long term goal, does not appear to be on the 
immediate horizon.  Accordingly, firms doing business globally must remain attuned to 
the diverse legal landscape in this area. Likewise, policy makers and courts should 
continue to consider solutions that limit the potential for forum shopping among 
jurisdictions and a jurisdictional “race to the bottom”. 
 
  
                                               
95  Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, Holding the Line on Patent Holdup: Why Antitrust 
Enforcement Matters (Mar, 21, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1350033/mcsweeny_-
_the_reality_of_patent_hold-up_3-21-18.pdf  
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Further Reading 
 
As noted at the outset, most of the issues discussed in this paper are addressed in 
greater detail in other work. Below are a few recommended resources that offer 
additional information in these areas. 
 
Books 
 
JORGE L. CONTRERAS, ED.  CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION 
LAW: VOL 1 - COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS (Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017), 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-technical-
standardization-law/0EC1655CDF81AF05BF8726C0904C3362  
 
This comprehensive reference work addresses the full range of patent and 
competition law issues arising from technical standardization. Chapters are 
contributed by leading scholars and practitioners around the world.  Many of the 
cases and actions discussed in this paper are addressed in substantially greater detail 
in this book. 
 
PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 46-47 (Keith 
Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18510/patent-
challenges-for-standard-setting-in-the-global-economy-lessons  
 
This authoritative report by the U.S. National Academies of Science (NAS) 
discusses many of the issues and controversies surrounding patenting and standards 
around the world. 
 
COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
PATENT POLICY MANUAL, App. A (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007) 
 
This practical manual offers a detailed analysis of common clauses found in the 
policies of many leading standards-development organizations, with explanations of 
text and alternatives. 
 
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY (1999). 
 
This now classic book explains the business and economic logic behind 
standardization and the standards wars of the past. 
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Chapters and Articles 
 
Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and 
Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical 
Approaches), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW, VOL. II – ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz, eds., Edward 
Elgar: 2018, forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2900540  
 
This comprehensive literature review summarizes much of the academic literature 
concerning standardization and intellectual property, with a focus on empirical 
studies.   
 
Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew Updegrove, A Practical Guide to Patent Policies of 
Standards Development Organizations, 67(6) STANDARDS ENGINEERING 1 (2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699615  
This short piece offers a practical explanation of SDO patent policies for business 
managers. 
 
Journals 
 
SSRN LAW, POLICY AND ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION EJOURNAL (Jorge 
L. Contreras, ed.) 
This eJournal, which has been distributed since 2013, offers a range of articles and 
papers relating to the law, policy and economics of technical standardization.  More 
than 600 articles are contained in its freely-accessible online archive at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&jo
urnal_id=2200736.  Users with institutional subscriptions to SSRN may subscribe to 
this journal without additional charge. 
 
 
 
